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PRODUCTS LIABILITY SYMPOSIUM
put a product into circulation and it was involved in the (injury
producing) event .... 13
It is still necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the product was
in a "defective" condition when it left the control of the manufac-
turer or seller.14 This also involves the concept of the product being
in a condition "unreasonably dangerous" to the user or con-
sumer.15 It is also necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the defect
in the product was a cause of the injury.
The basic section 402A rules are not all settled. As noted, the
following four comments deal with four unsettled questions. These
questions are: (1) What is or is not a "product" under section
402A?; (2) Should a manufacturer be excused in a "strict liability"
case because the "state of the art," at the time of sale and'prior to
injury, was such as to make it impossible or impractical to mini-
mize a known or knowable risk?; (3) Should a manufacturer be
excused in a "strict liability" case because the injury resulted from
a danger that was a scientifically unknowable risk prior to the
injury?; and (4) May an entier industry be held liable for injuries
caused by its products?
JAMES P. MALONEY
JAMES T. MURRAY, JR.
RICHARD E. BYRNE
DONALD A. SCHOENFELD
WHAT IS OR IS NOT A PRODUCT WITHIN THE
MEANING OF SECTION 402A
I. INTRODUCTION
The rapid development of products liability is typified by the
expansion of section 402A of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS. 1 In
13. P. Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture
and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559 (1969).
14. Id. at 563; Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 460, 155 N.W.2d 55, 63 (1967); see
also: W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971).
15. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); 2 FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A(4)(e); but see: Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501
P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); and Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. Super, 599,
304 A.2d 562 (1973).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any "product" in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
1974]
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1961, tentative draft Number 6 recommended adoption of a new
section, section 402A, which recognized strict liability for sellers
of food for human consumption. In 1962, tentative draft Number
7 expanded the coverage of the section to include "products in-
tended for intimate bodily use." The final draft, in 1964, extended
coverage still further to include "any product."
While the rule was expressly limited to a "person engaged in
the business of selling products for use or consumption, ' '2 the draf-
ter's attempt to define what was meant by the "sale of any prod-
uct" resulted in a mere listing of various products which were to
be included.3 While this definition was declaratively simple it has
suffered an expansive interpretation at the hands of courts faced
with situations not falling within the literal language of the section.
There has been a discernible trend on the part of various courts
to expand the "product" and/or "sale" definitions to include var-
ious transactions in which the policies underlying section 402A
justify the imposition of strict liability, but which transactions do
not fit neatly within the precise language of the section.
Therefore in order to determine whether a particular transac-
tion comes within the definition of the "sale of any product" it
becomes necessary to isolate the social policy justifications for the
imposition of strict liability.4 These policy justifications were
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) The seller is engaged in the business of selling, and
(b) It is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it was sold.
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment d provides:
The rule stated in this Section is not limited to the sale of food for human consump-
tion, or other products for intimate bodily use, although it will obviously include
them. It extends to any product sold in the condition, or substantially the same
condition, in which it is expected to reach the ultimate user or consumer. Thus the
rule stated applies to an automobile, a tire, an airplane, a grinding wheel, a water
heater, a gas stove, a power tool, a riveting machine, a chair and an insecticide. It
applies also to products which, if they are defective, may be expected to and do cause
only "physical harm" in the form of damage to the user's land or chattels, as in the
case of animal food or a herbicide.
4. Comment c of § 402A suggests the justification for imposing such liability:
...the seller, by marketing his product for use or consumption, has undertaken
and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the consuming public
who may be injured by it; . . . public policy demands that the burden of accidental
injuries caused by products intended for consumption be placed on those who market
them, and be treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be
obtained; and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of
protection at the hands of someone, and that the proper persons to afford it are those
who market the product.
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clearly enumerated by the Arizona Appellate court in Lechuga,
Inc. v. Montgomery:4"
(1) The manufacturer can anticipate some hazards and
guard against their recurrence, which the consumer cannot do.
(2) The cost of injury may be overwhelming to the person
injured while the risk of injury can be insured by the manufac-
turer and be distributed among the public as a cost of doing
business.
(3) It is in the public interest to discourage the marketing
of defective products.
(4) It is in the public interest to place responsibility for
injury upon the manufacturer who was responsible for its reach-
ing the market.
(5) That this responsibility should also be placed upon the
retailer and wholesaler of the defective product in order that they
may act as the conduit through which liability may flow to reach
the manufacturer, where ultimate responsibility lies.
(6) That because of the complexity of the present day manu-
facturing processes and their secretiveness, the ability to prove
negligent conduct by the injured plaintiff is almost impossible.
(7) That the consumer does not have the ability to investi-
gate for himself the soundness of the product.
(8) That the consumer's vigilance has been lulled by adver-
tising, marketing devices and trademarks.
Ultimately both the definition of "product" and "sale" can be
determined only with reference to these policy justifications. Gen-
erally, where they apply, the court will label the transaction as
involving the sale of a product to which strict liability applies. Thus
the social policy underlying the doctrine has become the definition
of a "product" and "sale": That is, a transaction in which the
burden of consequent losses are best able to be borne by those in
a position to either control the risk or make an equitable distribu-
tion of the losses when they do occur.
II. LEASING TRANSACTION
Comment f of section 402A specifically limits the applicability
of section 402A to a person engaged in the business of selling
products for use or consumption. The issue was quickly confronted
as to whether one who leases personal property was "one who sells
any product" within the meaning of section 402A. Several courts
4.1. 12 Ariz. App. 32, 467 P.2d 256 (1970).
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
experienced little difficulty in finding the lessor-lessee relationship
sufficiently similar to the sale of a product to impose strict liability
on the theory that such lessors are engaged in the "commercial"
distribution of goods. These courts view the "sale" requirement of
section 402A as merely requiring a "transaction" by which a prod-
uct is placed or distributed in the stream of commerce.
The New Jersey court in Cintrone v. Hertz Leasing & Rental
Service,5 was the first court to extend the doctrine to the lessors of
goods. The court, in an effort to overcome the fact that there had
been no technical sale between the parties, reasoned that:
A bailor for hire, . . . puts motor vehicles into the stream of
commerce in a fashion not unlike a manufacturer or retailer
... . By analogy the same rule should be made applicable to
the U-drive-it bailor-bailee relationship.'
A similar result was reached by the California Court in McClaflin
v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co.7 The court held that:
Lessors of personal property, like manufacturers and retailers
thereof "are engaged in the business of distributing goods to the
public." They are an integral part of the overall. . . . marketing
enterprise that should bear the costs of injuries resulting from
defective products.'
The court justified its extension of strict liability to the lessor
because he may be the only member of the enterprise reasonably
available to the injured person and the imposition of strict liability
would serve as an incentive for safety. The court believed that
maximum protection would be afforded to the injured plaintiff
while working no injustice on the lessor for he could recover the
cost of strict liability by charging it to his business.
Thus the courts in these cases construe the "sale" requirement
to only require that the defendant be in the overall marketing
enterprise through which the product moves in reaching the con-
sumer and that he be better able to distribute the loss along the
chain of distribution than the injured party.
Other courts have declined to extend section 402A to a lease
transaction by a precise reading of the language of the section. In
Speyer Inc. v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,' an action was brought
5. 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
6. Id. at _, 212 A.2d at 777.
7. 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969).
8. Id. at - 79 Cal. Rptr. at 340.
9. 275 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Pa. 1967) aff'd 403 F.2d 766 (3d. Cir. 1968).
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by the owners of fire damaged property against a lessor of gasoline
pump equipment who had leased the equipment to the plaintiff.
The court, in refusing to extend strict liability to the transaction,
held that:
§402A is applicable by its terms to SELLERS. Since the Restate-
ment provides rules for lessors of chattels at Section 407 and 408
and makes no mention of lessors in Section 402A, it is apparent
that this section is not intended to be applied to any but sellers. °
While it has been suggested that the view of the Speyer court was
based on the isolated nature of the lease transaction within the
defendant's business,' 1 The unequivocal language of the court
negates the application of section 402A to any lease transaction
whether isolated or not.
Apparently in order to apply section 402A and its policy justifi-
cations, courts willing to extend its rule to lessors will require that
the lessor be engaged in the "business" of leasing. In Price v. Shell
Oil Co.," the California court noted that for the doctrine to apply
to a lessor of personal property the lessor must be found to be in
the business of leasing in the same general sense as the seller of
personalty is found to be in the business of manufacturing or retail-
ing. Thus, as in the case of sellers, the rule is inapplicable to the
occasional lessor.'2
In Cintrone and McClaflin, courts seeing no essential differ-
ence between sellers and lessors employed the same policy consid-
erations to justify imposition of strict liability in tort upon manu-
facturers and sellers. In addition, it should be noted that the leases
involved in these cases were made in the course of active, full time
marketing as part of an on-going business of leasing, not on a
casual basis.
Katz v. Slade13 graphically demonstrates the requirement of
"mass leasing" before strict liability will be extended. Plaintiff's
companion rented a golf cart from a municipal golf course; due to
a failure of the brakes plaintiff was injured and brought suit against
the municipality alleging strict liability. The court noted that in
other jurisdictions where the rule had been extended to lessors they
10. Id. at 868.
10.1. Comment, Strict Liability of the Bailor, Lessor and Licensor, 57 MARQ. L. REV.
111 (1973).
11. 2 Cal. 3d 245, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970).
12. See also, Conroy v. 10 Brewster Ave. Corp., 97 N.J. Super. 75, 234 A.2d 415 (1967);
Gallucio v. Hertz Corp., 1 111. App. 3d 272, 274 N.E.2d 178 (1971).
13. 460 S.W.2d 608 (Mo. 1970).
1974]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
have been "mass" lessors "placing their products in the stream of
commerce as an integral part of the overall marketing enter-
prise.""4 The Missouri court contrasted these cases to the non-
commercial, non-profit, non-advertised amusement facility of a
golf course. Because the carts were supplied to patrons who desired
to use them as a casual operation and strictly incidental to the
operation of the course, the court held strict liability inapplicable
to the lessor.
Therefore, where the lease transaction is of such a nature that
the policy reasons for strict liability are applicable, the courts have
shown a willingness to abandon a strict interpretation of the "sale"
definition in section 402A and have imposed liability. While the
term "sale" has been given a broad definition stretching beyond
the ordinarily understood concept of what constitutes a sale, the
courts still require that there be a transaction which is essentially
commercial in nature by which the product is transmitted into the
stream of commerce.
III. LICENSORS, INVITORS AND LANDOWNERS SUPPLYING A
PRODUCT
The California Appellate Court recently extended strict liabil-
ity to licensors of personal property.15 An eleven-year-old boy sus-
tained an injury to his arm when a washing machine in a laundro-
mat started to operate as he was removing clothes from the ma-
chine. The evidence established that the machine was defective.
Plaintiff alleged strict liability against the owner of the
laundromat.
In holding strict liability applicable the court stated:
Although respondent is not engaged in the distribution of the
product, in the same manner as a retailer or lessor, he does
provide the product to the public for use by the public and conse-
quently does play more than a random role in the overall market-
ing enterprise of the product in question. Thus the rationale of
Greenman. . . applies as logically to licensors of a chattel as to
the manufacturer, retailer or lessors thereof.'6
In constrast to Garcia v. Halsett, 7 the Arizona Appellate
Court refused to extend section 402A by classifying the defendant
14. Id. at 613.
15. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
16. Id. at -, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423.
17. Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
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as an invitor rather than a seller. In Wagner v. Coronet Hotel,"8
plaintiff, a guest of defendant's hotel, slipped on an allegedly defec-
tive bath mat provided for the use of the patrons. The court found
that the relationship between the hotel and guest was that of
invitor-invitee and that consequently the hotel owed only the duty
of keeping the premises reasonably safe. This duty, the court hed,
was premised on defendant's status as a landowner rather than as
a supplier of goods on the premises.
Factually there seems little difference warranting a distinction
between a licensor of washing machines and an invitor to the hotel
premises. However there is a substantial difference between the
cases which justifies application of strict liability in Garcia and the
denial of strict liability in Wagner. In Garcia, the owner of the
laundromat was supplying a product as his sole commercial en-
deavor. In Wagner, the hotel owner was merely making the prod-
uct available incidental to his business as an innkeeper.
In Freitas v. Twin City Fisherman's Coop. Ass'n.,19 the court
refused to extend strict liability to the owner of a tank and-ladder.
The ladder, constructed by an independent contractor on defen-
dant's land, collapsed while plaintiff was using it. The decision
indicates that there is a fundamental difference between supplying
a product for another's use and merely having a product on one's
land. There must be a transaction by which the product is placed
in the stream of commerce. Plaintiff in this case was merely a
licensee on the defendant's premises.
Courts confronted with licensors of chattels will most likely
extend strict liability in the same situations in which strict liability
has been extended to the lessors of chattels. That is, if the transac-
tion of license is the means by which the product is expected to
reach the consumer in the stream of commerce and forms a sub-
stantial part of the defendant's business, the licensor's role in the
commercial chain of distribution will be sufficient to make the
policy justifications of strict liability applicable to transaction and
thus section 402A will be applied. Where, however, the license is
non-commerical in nature or merely incidental to defendants' prin-
ciple business, liability will revolve around the common law classi-
fications of enterants as licensees, invitees or trespassers, and the
corresponding duties owed by the land owner with respect to such
enterants.
18. 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969).
19. 452 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
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IV. REAL ESTATE SALES
Until the last few years the doctrine of caveat emptor was a
well established rule in the sale of real estate. Under this doctrine
there were no warranties in the sale of a house. Any obligation to
survive the transfer of title would have to be included in the deed
of title as a covenant. Thus liability for defective products was
restricted to the sale of chattels and not real estate. In real estate
all obligations or warranties were merged in the deed of title.
Upon first consideration of the issue whether strict liability
should be extended to the builders and vendors of homes, the Cali-
fornia court refused to hold the builder strictly liable. In Halliday
v. Greene21 the court found what it believed to be important differ-
ences between products liability and construction cases: (1) the
builder or contractor is seldom in a position to limit his liability
by disclaimers and thereby defeat recovery; (2) it is considerably
less difficult for the occupant of a building to trace the source of a
defect to the builder or contractor than it is for the consumer to
trace the source of defect through the modern complex system of
manufacturers; and (3) there is a reasonable opportunity for
inspection of a building before accepting it contrasted with the
absence of any opportunity to make a meaningful inspection of the
retailed product.
This case, while followed in 1968 in Connolley v. Bull, 2 was
overruled by Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc..22 However other
jurisdictions have followed Halliday's refusal to extend 402A to the
vendor of a home. The Colorado court recently refused to extend
strict liability against a home builder who originally installed a
sliding door which a five-year-old boy ran into and was injured.2
The Colorado court justified its refusal to extend strict liability to
the builder upon the belief that there is a greater opportunity for
inspection than in the ordinary consumer product cases and that
it is less difficult to trace the source of the defect to the builder than
to a manufacturer.
A few courts have held the builder or other vendors of a new
dwelling strictly liable for defective construction causing injury or
loss to the vendee or other persons. Generally strict liability has
been applied where (1) the builder or vendor is in the business of
20. 244 Cal. App. 2d 482, 53 Cal. Rptr. 267 (1966).
21. 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689 (1968).
22. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
23. Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179 (Colo. App. 1972).
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selling new homes on a mass scale; (2) where the home was ex-
pected to and did reach the vendee without substantial change in
condition; and (3) the policy justifications underlying strict liability
are applicable.
The New Jersey court was the first one to extend strict liability
to the home developer. In Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc.,24 plain-
tiff's home was constructed by defendants. A child of the vendee's
tenant was scalded by hot water drawn from the faucet of the
bathroom sink. The injury was caused by the builder-vendor's fail-
ure to install a mixing valve to reduce the temperature after the
water left the heating boiler.
The court held the defendant strictly liable stating:
When a vendee buys a development home from an advertised
model as in a Levitt or in a comparable project, he clearly relies
on the skill of the developer and on the implied representations
that hjs house will be reasonably fit for habitation. He has no
architect or other professional advice of his own; he has no real
competency to inspect on his own; his actual examination is in
the nature of things superficial. . . .The public interest dictates
that if such injuries do result from the defective construction its
cost should be borne by the responsible developer who created
the danger and who is in the better economic position to bear the
loss rather than the injured party who justifiably relied on the
developer's skill and implied representations.2 5
The court believed that the purchasers of homes sold on a massive
scale are no more able to protect themselves in the deed than
consumers of retailed products are able to protect themselves in a
bill of sale.
Upon reconsideration of Halliday v. Greene2 and Connolley v.
Bull,27 the California court adopted the reasoning of the New Jer-
sey court. In Kreigler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 8 the California Ap-
pellate Court held that the 402A doctrine may be applied in a suit
by a homeowner based on defective construction against one en-
gaged in the mass production and sale of tract homes. In Kreiglerl
defendant had constructed over 4,000 homes in which steel tube
radiant systems had been installed in the concrete floor. Kreigler's
24. 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
25. Id. at -, 207 A.2d at 325.
26. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
27. Wright v. Creative Corp., 498 P.2d 1179 (Colo. App. 1972).
28. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969).
29. Id.
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predecessor had purchased one of the homes in 1952 and plaintiff
purchased it in 1957. In 1959, due to corrosion the steel tubing
failed causing damage to the plaintiff. The trial court found, re-
gardless of negligence, that defendant was liable under strict liabil-
ity because the system as installed was defective. In affirming, the
Court of Appeals held:
We think, in terms of today's society there are no meaningful
distinctions between Eichler's mass production and sale of homes
and the mass production and sale of automobiles and that the
pertinent overriding policy considerations are the same."
The California court has taken the application of strict liability
in real estate sales beyond mere defects in the structure on the land
and has applied it to the real property itself. In A vner v. Longridge
Estates"' the purchasers of a lot and house located on a hillside
r:brought an action against the firm that "constructed the lot"
from fill. The lot was "made" from fill which was not properly
compacted and as a consequence, after plaintiffs home was built
on it, the lot settled. The court in applying strict liability assumed
that the defendant had "manufactured" the real estate lot:
We conclude that the manufacturer of a lot may be held strictly
liable in tort for damages suffered by the owner as a proximate
result of any defects in the manufacturing process.32
To the contrary, in Cox v. Shaffer 3 the Pennsylvania court
refused to hold the manufacturer of a silo on plaintiff's land strictly
liable. The decedent entered a silo manufactured by the defendant
and was asphyxiated by lethal fumes therein. Plaintiff alleged that
under section 402A the silo was defective in that defendant failed
to provide for ventilation of air. The court held that:
A silo constructed in place on the employer's land is not the sale
of a 'product.' 402A applies only to one who sells a product. A
building so constructed on the site is not a product within the
meaning of §402A.14
The opinion in Cox v. Shaffetr3 indicates that before applying
strict liability to the construction of buildings, the builder must be
30. Id. at -, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
31. 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1969).
32. Id. at -, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
33. 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (1973).
34. Id. at -, 302 A.2d at 457.
35. 223 Pa. Super. 429, 302 A.2d 456 (1973).
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engaged in mass production or development. The court there held
that a silo constructed on land was not a "product." Realistically
the silo was not a "product" because the policy justifications for
strict liability did not apply to the transaction. There was no indi-
cation that the builder was mass producing the silos or that the
landowner was denied a reasonable opportunity to inspect. Nor
was there any indication that the builder was in a better economic
position to distribute the risk of loss. Therefore the silo was "not
a product within the meaning of §402A."
From the foregoing cases, it is seen that several courts faced
with the sale of real estate will extend the definition of "product"
under 402A to include the sale of a home. The sale of a home or
real estate does not technically fit within the language of 402A.
Section 402A in its strict construction applies only to the supplier
of a chattel. While real estate is not actually a "product" in the
strict sense of a chattel, the policy justifications for strict liability
have become applicable to the mass developer of homes. Conse-
quently the definition of product has been expanded to include real
estate in those instances where (1) the builder is engaged in the
mass production and construction of real estate tracts, analogous
to the mass marketing of retailed consumer goods; (2) where the
vendee because of such mass production, has been afforded no
meaningful opportunity to inspect and the developer is in a better
position to control and discover the defect; and (3) where the devel-
oper who created the danger is in a better economic position to
bear the loss than the injured party who relied on the skill of the
developer.
V. PRODUCT-SERVICE DISTINCTION-THE HYBRID
TRANSACTION
As in prior warranty cases, courts have experienced some diffi-
culty where both the sale of a product and the performance of a
service are involved in the same transaction. However, in these
hybrid sales-service transactions under section 402A, a workable
distinction in the cases has evolved which divergent courts have
shown remarkable consistency in applying. Generally where the
transaction is "commerical" in nature courts will find the sale of
a "product" within 402A because the policy justifications of strict
liability are applicable to the commerical transaction. Where the
transaction is "professional" in nature the courts have found that
"services" predominate and that no product was sold. The reason
for the distinction is that in the ordinary professional transaction
19741
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the justifications for strict liability are inapplicable. Thus what is
defined as the "sale of a product" is determined by the underlying
social philosophy of section 402A.
A. Commercial Transaction
Under warranty law the first cases distinguishing between the
rendering of services and the sale of goods were cases involving the
sale of food in a restaurant. The authorities were split over whether
the operator of a restaurant sells a patron the food he serves or
whether he merely renders a service .3 Generally by the time sec-
tion 402A had been adopted a majority of the courts had held that
the food furnished in the restaurant was paramount and the prepa-
ration and serving of it only incidental to the transaction.3 7
In Watchel v. Roso18 plaintiff entered defendant's restaurant
and ordered an egg salad sandwich for his immediate consumption.
The sandwich was served and upon eating it plaintiff became vio-
lently ill. The court held that strict liability should apply to this
type of transaction because: "the sandwich in this case falls within
the meaning of 'any product.' "I'
The justification for imposing strict liability on the restaurant
owner is that he is in a better position than the patron to control
the quality of food or discover a defect. In addition, the restaurant
owner is in a better position to distribute the loss to one better able
to bear it by passing the loss up the chain of distribution to the
person ultimately responsible. In designating the sandwich "a
product" the Connecticut court was merely stating that the res-
taurant owner was in a better position to control the risk and to
distribute losses when they do occur.
In commerical transactions other than the sale of food, courts
have similarly experienced no difficulty in applying strict liability
to the hybrid service-sale transaction. In Worrell v. Barnes" defen-
dant contracted with the plaintiff to remodel her home. Part of the
contract provided for the installation of a water heater by running
a gas line to the existing gas system. A leaky fitting which was part
36. Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117 Conn. 128, 167 A. 99 (1933); Betehia v. Cape Code
Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1959) (services held to predominate); Friend v.
Childs Dining Hall Co., 231 Mass. 65, 120 N.E. 407 (1918).
37. Betehia v. Cape Code Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W. 2d 64 (1959) (services held
to predominate).
38. 159 Conn. 496, 271 A.2d 84 (1970).
39. Id. at -, 271 A.2d at 86.
40. 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971).
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of the work caused gas to escape as a result of which plaintiff's
home burned. The court, holding the contractor strictly liable,
stated that "the leaky fitting comes within the definition of a defec-
tive product."4 Clearly this case did not fit within the definition
of a sale of a product as distinguished from the rendering of serv-
ices. However, because the transaction was commercial in nature
the policy justifications of section 402A may be said to apply.
The leading case dealing with applicability of section 402A in
the hybrid sale and service transaction within a commercial setting
is Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.4 2 Plaintiff went to defendant's beauty
salon to have her hair washed and set. Defendant used a permanent
wave solution manufactured by Helene Curtis. As a result of the
treatment plaintiff developed acute dermatitis. The court held that
strict liability was properly applicable to the operator of the beauty
salon because the policy reasons for applying such liability in the
case of ordinary sales are equally applicable to "a commercial
transaction such as that existing in this case between a beauty
parlor operator and a patron."43
B. Professional Transaction
In sale-service hybrid transactions involving a professional,
courts will refuse to apply section 402A. The basis of the distinc-
tion between the commercial and professional transaction was
enunciated in Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.," wherein the court ex-
tended strict liability to the commercial service-sale hybrid trans-
action. The court stated:
The beautician is engaged in a commercial enterprise; the dentist
and doctor in a profession . . . . The dentist or doctor does not
and cannot advertise for patients; the demand for his services
stems for a felt necessity of the patient . . . . His performance
is not mechanical or routine because each patient requires indi-
vidual study and formulation of an informed judgment . ...
Such men are not producers or sellers of property in any reasona-
bly acceptable sense of the term . . . . Thus their paramount
function - the essence of their function - ought to be regarded as
the furnishing of opinions and services . . . . In our judgment,
the nature of the services, the utility and need for them . . . are
so important to the general welfare as to outweigh in the policy
41. Id. at ____ 484 P.2d at 576.
42. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1966).
43. Id. at ____ 258 A.2d at 702.
44. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1966).
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scale any need for the imposition on dentists and doctors of the
rules of strict liability in tort.45
Based on the above distinction between professional and com-
mercial hybrid transactions, various courts have refused to extend
section 402A to doctors," hospitals," optometrists," dentists,49
architects,50 and surveyors.51
In a suit against a hospital where plaintiff was injured when a
surgical needle broke in the course of an operation, the court re-
fused to apply strict liability. 5 The court found that a hospital is
not ordinarily engaged in the business of selling any of the products
or equipment it uses in providing services. The essence of the rela-
tionship between a hospital and its patients does not relate to any
product or piece of equipment it uses but to the professional serv-
ices it applies. The court noted that:
A significant common element running through the cases which
have extended strict liability is that each defendant against whom
the standard has been applied played an integral and vital role
in the overall production and marketing enterprise. Each defen-
dant was a link in getting the product to the consumer.0
The social policy distinctions between the commercial and pro-
fessional transaction were clearly delineated in Magrine v.
Krasnica.54 Plaintiff, a patient of defendant dentist was injured
when a hypodermic needle being used with due care to administer
a local anesthetic broke off in plaintiff's jaw. The break resulted
from a latent defect in the needle. It was held that strict liability
did not apply because the essence of the relationship with the pa-
tient was the furnishing of professional services and therefore the
doctor's action could only be tested by negligence principles.
Noting that strict liability is not restricted to transactions fall-
45. Id. at _, 258 A.2d at 702.
46. Carmichael v. Rietz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971).
47. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971);
Shivers v. Good Shepard Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
48. Barbee v. Rodgers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (1968).
49. Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967), aff'd 100 N.J. Super.
223, 241 A.2d 637 (1968).
50. La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 137 (3d Cir. 1968); Laukkanen v. Jewel
Tea Co., 78 II1. App. 2d 153, 222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
51. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill.. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
52. Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971).
53. Id. at _, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
54. 94 N.J. Super. 228, 227 A.2d 539 (1967) affd 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637
(1968).
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ing within the technical definition of a sale, the court observed that:
(1) the dentist was in no better position to control, inspect and
discover the defect in the needle; (2) the dentist did not put the
article in the stream of commerce nor promote its purchase by the
general public but was merely a user of it; and (3) the dentist was
not in a position to better spread the risk through insurance.
In La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co.5" the court again distin-
guished the professional versus commercial transaction. Here a
workman was allegedly exposed to carcinogenic dust and upon his
death his widow brought an action against the company hired by
the employer to design, engineer and supervise the initial operation
of the plant. In refusing to apply strict liability the court clearly
differentiated between "professional services" and sale of "con-
sumer products":
Professional services do not lend themselves to the doctrine of
tort liability without fault because they lack the elements which
gave rise to the doctrine. There is no mass production of goods
or a large body of distant customers whom it would be unfair to
require to trace the article they used along the channels of trade
to the original manufacturer and there to pinpoint an act of
negligence remote from their knowledge or even from their abil-
ity to inquire. Thus, professional services form a marked contrast
to consumer product cases and even in those jurisdictions which
have adopted a rule of strict liability, a majority of decisions have
declined to apply it to professional services.56
Barbee v. Rodgers17 demonstrates the lenghts to which courts
are willing to go to decline application of section 402A where a
professional is involved. Plaintiff who suffered injuries to his eyes
as a result of improperly fitting contact lenses argued that the
optometrists were liable under section 402A. The Texas court
stated that this was not the act of one selling a product within the
meaning of section 402A. The court noted that the lenses were not
a product generally offered to the public in the regular channels
of trade and that the considerations supporting strict liability were
not present. However it should be noted that the defendant in this
case was engaged in a substantial "commercial" enterprise. Defen-
dant owned an entire chain of eighty-four offices throughout Texas
and yet the court still refused to apply strict liability because defen-
55. 402 F.2d 937 (3d Cir. 1968).
56. Id. at 942.
57. 425 S.W.2d 342 (1968).
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dant was engaged in rendering professional services.
Therefore courts have refused to extend strict liability to the
professional hybrid transaction on the ground that the policy justi-
fications of section 402A are inapplicable. Finding the policy rea-
sons inapplicable professional services do not qualify as a product
within the meaning of section 402A.
VI. "PURE SERVICE" TRANSACTIONS
Generally where pure services are involved a court will find that
such services are not a product and will refuse to apply strict
liability regardless of whether the services are commercial or pro-
fessional.5 8
In Raritian Trucking Corp. v. Aero Commander, Inc.59 an
airplane owner brought an action against an airplane servicer to
recover damages to his plane. The plane had crashed when a wing
separated during aerobatic manuevers. The court refused to extend
strict liability to a case where no goods or other property, but only
a service were supplied - even though the court admitted that many
of the policy considerations were present. The court applying New
Jersey law discussed numerous authorities for its conclusion that
New Jersey would restrict application of strict liability to cases
involving "the sale of goods or other property and to those involv-
ing transactions analogous to sales."6
Likewise in Hillas v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.6" plaintiff
brought an action against an elevator maintenance company which
immediately prior to the accident serviced the elevator in which
plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff alleged strict liability claiming that
the contractor should be held to the same standard as a manufac-
turer. The court disagreed, holding that the liability of a service
company which merely services articles supplied by another does
not extend beyond negligence. The court specifically distinguished
Newmark v. Gimbel's Inc.12 on the ground that the strict liability
applied there was based upon the hybrid service-sale transaction as
constrasted to the pure service function performed by the elevator
company. Therefore, regardless of the fact that the policy justifica-
tions may be applicable, the court will require that some product
58. Rozny v. Marnul, 43 Ill. 2d 54, 250 N.E.2d 656 (1969).
59. 458 F.2d 1106 (3d Cir. 1972).
60. Id. at 1114.
61. 120 N.J. Super. 105, 293 A.2d 419 (1972).
62. 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1966).
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be furnished giving the transaction a character at least analogous
to a sale.
VII. BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS
This area is actually in the nature of the product-service hybrid
transaction involving a professional service. However because of
the substantial body of case law and the existence of problems
peculiar to blood, separate consideration is merited.
The leading case in this area is Perlmutter v. Beth David
Hospital.63 Until recently it has been considered the definitive
treatment of the subject and has stood for the proposition that a
paying patient at a hospital who receives impure blood is the recipi-
ent of a "service" and not the sale of a "good". Therefore the
patient was held to be unable to recover under breach of implied
warranty. The court in reaching its conclusion noted that:
. . . when one enters a hospital as a patient; he goes there not
to buy medicine or pills, not to purchase bandages or iodine or
serum or blood but to obtain a course of treatment in the hope
of being cured of what ails him."
Recently several courts have abandoned Perlmutter and its pro-
geny and applied strict liability to the furnishing of contaminated
blood. 15
The Illinois Court in Cunningham v. McNeal Mem. Hospital6
was one of the first courts to break from Perlmutter. Defendant
argued that whole human blood was not a "product" as that term
is used in the Restatement. The court found that the hospital was
engaged in the business of "selling" blood for transfusion into
patients and that the blood was a "product" within the meaning
of section 402A. The court noted in Cunningham that in modern
63. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
64. Id. at - 123 N.E.2d at 796.
65. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967) rev. 249 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1969). In Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hosp., the New Jersey Superior Court found that § 402A did apply to the
hospital supplying blood, but imposed no liability because blood was found not to be
"unreasonably dangerous" because of the inability to discover the presence of hepatitis. The
Court indicated that:
. . . the nature of the transaction in which the product is transferred for a considera-
tion is not determinative . . . . It makes no difference whether the transaction was
a sale or a service if the basic policy considerations which lead to strict liability are
applicable.
The court pointed out that strict liability is not conditioned upon advertising to promote
sale, but that it arises from the mere presence of the product on the market. The decision
however was later reversed and remanded for a further development of the record.
66. 47 I1. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (Il1. 1970).
19741
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
times the operation of hospitals has become one of the biggest
businesses in the country and therefore there was no need for pro-
tecting its funds.
The Superior Court of New Jersey, faced with an action for
death caused by hepatitis infection, extended 402A to the transac-
tion upon pure policy grounds." The court began its analysis by
stating that Perlmutter dealt only with what the New Jersey court
believed to be a semantical question of whether the transaction was
a "sale" or a "service," and that Cunningham dealt only with the
verbal formula of section 402A. The court, rejecting this approach,
addressed itself solely to the policy justifications for the imposition
of strict liability.
The court believed the policy reasons to be: (1) adoption of
strict liability will force hospitals to deal only with blood banks
with good safety records, thus decreasing the risk; (2) strict liability
will spur hospitals to take a more active role in influencing the
blood banks collection process by requiring more careful screening
of donors; (3) it will encourage medical research to develop a test
for hepatitis; and (4) strict liability will have an allocative effect
for the hospital may allocate its hepatitis costs as a charge on each
unit of blood.
In Brody v. Overlook Hospital"8 the New Jersey court did not
begin with the question of whether the transfer of blood was a
"service" or "sale" or whether the blood was a "product", but
rather it looked to the policy reasons for extending strict liability.
Because it believed that public policy justified imposition of strict
liability, the transaction became a sale, not a service, and the blood
became a product in order to fit the blood transfusion within sec-
tion 402A. Therefore, the ultimate question, as viewed by the New
Jersey court, is not what is or is not a product within the meaning
of section 402A, but rather do the policy justifications of strict
liability apply to the transaction under consideration.
However Brody is not the last word in the area of blood trans-
fusions. Recently the California court, a leader in the extension of
strict liability to various different transactions, refused to extend
strict liability to the furnishing of blood. In Shepard v. Alexian
Bros. Hosp. Inc. 9 plaintiff attempted to recover in strict liability
and warranty against a hospital for hepatitis contracted from a
67. Brody v Overlook Hosp., 121 N.J. Super. 299 A.2d 668 (1972).
68. Id.
69. 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973).
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blood transfusion. A California statute declared that a blood trans-
fusion is the "rendition of a service. . . and shall not be construed
to be . . . a sale." Plaintiff asked the court to extend the strict
liability doctrine to include services, and to support this request,
plaintiff pointed out that the doctrine had already been extended
to a number of non-sale transactions including home builders,
bailors and of personal property and licensors of chattels.
In refusing plaintiff's request the court pointed out that none
of the reasons normally given by courts for extending strict liability
to manufacturers such as the ability to spread the loss, or profiting
from the transaction, apply to a hospital administering blood.
The California court, perhaps adopting Perlmutter, stated:
It needs no extended discussion to perceive that a hospital is
primarily devoted to the care and healing of the sick. The supply-
ing of blood by the hospital is entirely subordinate to its para-
mount function of furnishing trained personnel and specialized
facilities in an endeavor to restore the patient's health. Providing
medicine or supplying blood is simply a chemical aid or instru-
ment utilized to accomplish the object of cure or treatment. 70
The court continued stating that the hospital played "no vital
part in the overall marketing enterprise" and that imposition of
strict liability would not achieve the policy goal of an added incen-
tive for safety because of the present impossibility of detecting the
presence of hepatitis.
It should also be noted that 43 states have enacted statutes
similar to the California statute in Shepard.7' This indicates the
extent to which the area of blood transfusions is tied up in public
policy arguments. Apparently the vast majority of legislatures do
not share the view of the Brody court as to the better means of
serving public policy.
VIII. USED PRODUCTS
Section 402A does not expressly state whether the rule of strict
liability applied to the seller of a defective used product. However
section 402A is made applicable to "any person engaged in the
business of selling products for use or consumption." This would
appear to include the seller of a used defective product, but as of
yet no court has definitively applied 402A to the seller of a used
product.
70. Id. at -, 109 Cal Rptr. at 134.
71. CCH PRODUCTS LIABILITY REPORTER 91 1187.
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In Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co.72 defendant sold a
used drum to plaintiff's employer. While plaintiff was attempting
to cut the drum in half with a torch, the fumes from the paint which
was originally stored in the drum, exploded. The court noted the
absence of cases applying strict liability to the seller of a used
product. The court did not however rest its holding on the basis of
non-applicability of section 402A, but rather found that the drum
was not in "a defective condition unreasonably dangerous" to the
user or consumer because at the time of the accident the drum was
not being used in the manner or purpose for which it had been
originally manufactured. By implication it may be said that the
court approved the applicability of 402A to the sellers of defective
used products.
Likewise the Oregon court in Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc."
implied that the doctrine was applicable to the seller of used cars.
A bystander sought to hold the used car dealer strictly liable when
he was struck by the used car when its brakes failed. There was
no evidence of negligence on the part of the used car dealer. The
court stated that:
We may assume without deciding that sellers of used cars are
subject to §402A .. . .By its terms of §402A is binding upon
one who sells any product in a defective condition. 74
Section 402A applies to the seller of any product in a defective
condition. The drafters of the Restatement made no distinction
between used and new products. The words "any product" would
apparently apply to either. Reasoned prediction evolved from the
case law in other areas commands a belief that the dealer in used
products will be held strictly liable so long as the other elements
of 402A are satisfied and the policy justification for strict liability
is applicable. The courts in this area, as in the case of new prod-
ucts, will require that the defendant be in the business of selling
used products. Strict liability will be denied where the defendant
merely sells used products on a casual basis.
IX. COMPONENT PARTS
Comment p of section 402A points out that the rule has not
gone beyond "products" which are used in the condition, or in
substantially the same condition in which they are expected to
72. 253 So. 2d 837 (Miss. 1971).
73. 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971).
74. Id. at -, 484 P.2d at 303.
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reach the hands of the ultimate user or consumer. This problem
arises where there has been the sale of a component part of a
product to be assembled by another.
The question is essentially whether the responsibility for discov-
ery and prevention of the defect is shifted to the intermediate party
who is to make the changes. In comment q to section 402A the
Institute expresses no opinion on the matter but states:
It is no doubt to be expected that where there is no change in
the component part itself, but it is merely incorporated into
something larger, the strict liability will be found to carry
through to the ultimate user or consumer.75
A leading case involving the applicability of strict liability to
the maker of component parts is Burbage v. Boiler Engineering &
Supply Co.76 The court held the component manufacturer strictly
liable and adopted the language of comment q. Defendant argued
that its valve was only a component part and not a product. The
court held that the very product sold was a valve - a unit, despite
the fact that it would be ultimately installed in some assembly and
that only a substantial change made by another in the original
defective condition would relieve the component manufacturer and
that a mere change not affecting the original defective condition
would not. It is only where there has been a substantial change in
the component part itself or where the cause of the injury is not
directly attributable to the component that the maker of the com-
ponent can escape strict liability.77
There are strong arguments against imposing strict liability on
the makers of component parts. If the doctrine is not applied to
the seller of a component part the purpose of strict liability will
not be frustrated since the ultimate manufacturer or assembler will
remain subject to it. The seller of the component part will be
relieved of the onerous burden of insuring the use to which his
product is put in the design, fabrication and assembly of other
products while remaining liable under ordinary concepts of negli-
gence and breach of warranty. The courts should be reluctant to
abrogate common law and statutory concepts of negligence and
warranty where the social policy is otherwise served. Since the user
or consumer is adequately protected by imposition of strict liability
75. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) ToRTs § 402 Comment q.
76. 433 Pa. 319, 249 A.2d 563 (1969).
77. City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58 Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866
(1973).
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upon the manufacturer or seller of the finished product it is unnec-
essary to enlarge its scope to the sellers of component parts.
These policy reasons for not extending strict liability were
clearly indicated in Walker v. Stauffer Chem. Corp..7S Plaintiff was
injured as a result of the explosion of a drain cleaner. The drain
cleaner was manufactured by Fazio and contained sulfuric acid
manufactured by Stauffer. It was contemplated by Stauffer that
the acid would be compounded into a drain cleaner. The ultimate
product was not that manufactured by defendant. The court seeing
no compelling reason for extension of strict liability to the present
case stated that:
We do not believe it realistically feasible or necessary to the
protection of the public to require the manufacturer of a standard
chemical ingredient. . . not having control over the subsequent
compounding, packaging or marketing of an item eventually
causing injury to the ultimate consumer to bear the responsibility
of that injury. The manufacturer of the product causing the in-
jury is so situated as to afford the necessary protection. 79
Whether a component part is a "product" within Section 402A
should be determined by the applicability of the policy underlying
the doctrine. Where such policy is applicable a court may feel
justified in extending 402A. However a court should not without
such justification abandon common law principles of negligence.
X. VARIOUS OTHER TRANSACTIONS
The plaintiff in Hanberry v. Hearst Corp.0 presented a novel
approach in seeking to establish the defendant's liability under
strict liability for endorsing another party's product with the use
of its "Good Housekeeping" seal and advertisement. The court
held that the doctrine did not apply to one not directly involved in
manufacturing products for or supplying products to the consum-
ing public. The theory therefore was held not to apply to a general
endorser who made no representation of having examined or tested
the particular article which caused the injury. Thus while the en-
dorser may play some role in the marketing of products, he is not
such an integral part of the system to justify the application of
strict liability.
78. 19 Cal. App. 3d 669, 96 Cal. Rptr. 803 (1971).
79. Id. at _ 96 Cal. Rptr. at 806.
80. 276 Cal. App. 2d, 81 Cal Rptr. 519 (1969).
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In Carter v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co.,81 plaintiff was injured
when a dress she was wearing ignited at a dinner party. The defen-
dant was the owner of a trademark identifying garments, fabrics
and articles made according to specification and quality standards
prescribed and controlled by the defendant. The defendant al-
lowed the manufacturer .of the dress to use the trademark and thus
was a "licensor" or the trademark.
Defendants contended that they could not be held strictly liable
because they were not a "seller" within the meaning of section
402A. The court in holding the defendant liable stated that:
: * * the defendants were sufficiently involved in the manufactur-
ing process to be a "seller" . . . .One who puts out as his own
product a chattel manufactured by another is subject to the same
liability as though he were its manufacturer.12
XI. THE WISCONSIN LAW
Although having adopted section 402A,3 the Wisconsin court
has not been presented with a situation requiring it to consider the
extension of section 402A to various transactions outside the literal
language of a "sale of a product."84 However, the decision of
Dippel v. Sciano 5 gives some indication of the approach which the
court would likely take if the situation presented itself.
The court in Dippel, justifying its adoption of strict liability,
stated:
. . . the seller is in a paramount position to distribute the costs
of the risks created by the defective product he is selling. He may
pass the costs on to the consumer via increased prices. He may
protect himself either by purchasing insurance or by a form of
self-insurance. In justification of making the seller pay for the
risk, it is argued that the consumer or user has the right to rely
on the apparent safety of the product and that it is the seller in
the first instance who creates the risk by placing the defective
product on the market. A correlative consideration where the
81. 360 F. Supp. 1103 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
82. Id. at 1106-1107.
83. Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
84. In Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973), the
Wisconsin District Court considered the applicability of strict liability to "mechanical and
administrative services" provided by a hospital. The District Court, in an attempt to decide
the matter as the Wisconsin Court would, denied the hospital's motion to dismiss, stating
that "a conclusion that it is in the public interest to hold a hospital strictly liable for
supplying a particular defective service cannot be ruled out as a matter of law."
85. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
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manufacturer is concerned is that the manufacturer has the
greatest ability to control the risk created by his product since
he may initiate or adopt inspection and quality control measures
thereby preventing defective products from reaching the con-
sumer.
Although the court was isolating the policy justifications for
imposing strict liability on a manufacturer or retailer of a defective
product, it is apparent from the case law in other jurisdictions, that
the Wisconsin court would experience little difficulty in extending
section 402A to various transactions in which the social policy
expressed in Dippel would be served.
XII. CONCLUSION
Before it can be decided whether a "product" was in a defective
condition at the time it left the defendant's hands it must be de-
cided whether the "product" and the defendant are proper subjects
for the application of section 402A. This requires a finding that
there has been a sale of a product within the meaning of section
402A.
In extending strict liability to transactions which do not fall
within the literal definition of a "sale" or a "product", courts stress
that their purpose is to insure that the costs of injuries resulting
from defective products is borne by the persons who put such
products on the market rather than the injured person. As addi-
tional reason for imposing strict liability, it is also said that the
defendant profits from such transactions and is in a superior posi-
tion to protect himself by proper inspection and tests. Also imposi-
tion of such liability will promote safety by inducing a party with
potential strict liability to pressure his supplier for better products.
It is further suggested that the risk of injury can be insured or
distributed among the public as a cost of doing business.
These policy justifications will normally apply only to a com-
mercial transaction where defendants have played an integral and
vital part in the overall production and marketing enterprise.
Where these policies would be served by imposition of strict
liability in a particular case, the transaction under consideration
is the sale of a product. Thus, the policy justifications of section
402A have become the definition of a "product" and a "sale"
within the meaning of section 402A.
JAMES P. MALONEY
86. Id. at 450, 155 N.W.2d at 58.
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